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Introduction 
 
In this paper we set out a series of primarily conceptual arguments. Each argument may suggest 
further conceptual, empirical and normative analysis.  
 
We necessarily make a number of assumptions that we hope are reasonably clear, even where 
they are considered incorrect or flawed. Each assumption can be discussed further. 
 
Reasons for acting: financialisation and corporate responsibility  
 
We start with a general claim: firms have reasons for acting. We consider some key aspects of, 
and possible changes to, these reasons. This is of course only one of many starting points for the 
analysis of firms. 
 
We can describe multiple reasons for acting for each firm. However, we seem to recognise that 
firms ought to take certain actions and aim to produce certain outcomes. This suggests that, to this 
extent at least, these reasons can be described as ethical reasons.  
 
We focus on two dimensions of a firm’s reasons for acting. The first concerns the responsibility 
for actions and outcomes; in general this can be described as the degree of corporate 
responsibility. The second concerns the significance of various financial considerations; in 
general this can be described as the degree of financialisation.  
 
We suggest that changes to corporate responsibility and financialisation may inform a firm’s 
reasons for acting. These changes may have more of less significant implications for the firm, and 
over time this may change the nature of the firm. 
 
Four dimensions of value 
 
One way to model financialisation and corporate responsibility is to use an idea of value creation. 
In a market situation the firm may be described as a unit of value creation, with value measured 
as financial value.  
 
We suggest that this is a partial description of value creation. We suggest the idea of four 
dimensions of value comprising: narrow financial value, such as a return on shareholder 
investment; wide financial value, such as value created across the supply chain; external financial 
value, such as value measured financially but not accounted for by the firm; and, non-financial 
value, such as value that is not financially measureable.  
 
Figure 1 shows a model of the four dimensions of value. This includes a representation of the 
‘boundaries’ between each dimension. The foundations, implications and problems with the 
model can be discussed in more detail. 
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of the firm?
B - Boundary of the 
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environment?
Figure 1: Four dimensions of value
 
The four dimensions model provides a description of the value created by all the outcomes of a 
firm’s activities, including those outcomes that generate non-financial value. The total value 
created within each dimension, and across all the dimensions combined, may be positive or 
negative. Within Boundary A, positive and negative value is measured financially and will 
typically determine the success or failure of the firm in a market situation. Beyond Boundary A,  
positive and negative value may not be accounted for by the firm and may be only partially 
measured financially. 
 
In a market situation bounded by the rule of law, firms will typically account for narrow financial 
value. This will inform a firm’s reasons for acting. We can describe these reasons as based on two 
principles: principle F, make a positive financial return; and, principle L, operate within legal 
requirements. 
 
L and F describe the primary principles that firms will appeal to as reasons for acting in a market 
situation bounded by the rule of law.  
 
We can use this model to describe how the degree of corporate responsibility and financialisation 
may inform a firm’s reasons for acting. 
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Minimal-maximal spectrum of corporate responsibility 
 
Figure 2 shows a minimal-maximal spectrum of corporate responsibility across the four 
dimensions of value. Movement along the minimal-maximal spectrum suggests that firms take on 
increasing responsibility for the outcomes of their actions.  
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Minimal view 
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responsibility
Figure 2: Minimal-maximal spectrum of corporate responsibility
 
 
In order to consider the minimal-maximal spectrum in more detail, and to consider the degree of 
financialisation, we focus primarily on narrow financial value and Boundary A. Further 
dimensions and Boundaries can be discussed. 
 
Low-moderate-high spectrum of financialisation 
 
Figure 3 shows a spectrum of low-moderate-high financialisation within Boundary A. This 
spectrum suggests a movement from creating value from primarily financial outcomes to creating 
value from primarily tangible outcomes.  
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Figure 3: Minimal-maximal spectrum of corporate responsibility 
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We recognise that the assumptions, arguments and models suggested so far are subject to a series 
of criticisms that will reveal errors and flaws. We use the analysis so far to make some 
observations about the implications of financialisation and corporate responsibility for the firm.  
 
Comments on corporate responsibility 
 
We will first make some initial comments on corporate responsibility.  
 
Movement along the minimal-maximal spectrum within Boundary A 
 
Movement along the minimal-maximal spectrum within Boundary A suggests changes in 
corporate responsibility that maintains as relatively constant the market and legal situation.  
 
The degree of movement possible within Boundary A may be determined by the degree of 
informality of principles L and F as reasons for acting. For example: legal informality may result 
from issues of legal interpretation; financial informality may result from incomplete information 
about potential financial returns; and, both may result for information asymmetry between agents. 
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The informality of F may also suggest a range of market opportunities, all of which produce a 
positive financial return and are compatible with the acceptance of varying degrees of corporate 
responsibility
2
.  
 
Varying definitions of F may indicate aspects of informality. For example, the maximisation of 
shareholder value and making a positive return to shareholders may provide different reasons for 
acting; the latter may be described as satisfying shareholder value. 
 
Movement beyond Boundary A 
 
Movement beyond Boundary A may suggest changes to the nature of the firm. Where the firm 
takes responsibility for outcomes beyond this Boundary, this may suggest changes to L and F as 
principles.  
 
It is important to note at this point a difference between the two principles L and F. L is based on 
the idea of the rule of law. Any change in this principle would require a wider change in the role 
of the rule law. This is unlikely within liberal democratic political systems. We can discuss 
situations where this is possible.  
 
F as a principle is central to the arrangements underpinning market economies. However, F may 
not have the same foundational role as L in liberal democracies, although this view may be 
disputed. The existence of various hybrid types of firm may support this view
3
.  
 
On these views, change to the content of L does not change L as a principle. However, change to 
the content of F may change the principle itself. If F is defined as a return on shareholder 
investment (or a similar definition), then taking account of outcomes that do not contribute to 
shareholder value may change the definition of F.  
 
Movement beyond Boundary A may also suggest that L and F are not the only principles 
appealed to as reasons for acting. This keeps L and F constant and suggests further principles. We 
can describe the bundle of such principles as extended corporate responsibility (ECR)
4
.  
 
It may be argued that movement beyond Boundary A is not possible in a market situation. Taking 
into account outcomes beyond Boundary A is then a matter of public policy, regulation and 
legislation.  
 
Movement of Boundary A 
 
The movement of Boundary A suggest at least two kinds of change.  
 
 
                                                 
2 For example, consumers may express preferences for products that take into account different degrees of 
environmental impact. 
3 For example, an institutional arrangement may continue to be described as a firm even if it is wholly or partially 
owned by the state or receives financial support from agents other than financial investors and customers. Of course, it 
may be argued that these arrangements produce institutions that may not be described as firms. 
4 There may be a range of possible further principles such as human rights (HR), environmental impacts (E), working 
conditions (W), and others. Each will require a clear definition and, in many cases, clear standards. We can discuss the 
idea of these principles further, including the issues of ordering and prioritisation. 
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First, changes in the content of legislation and regulation have the effect of changing the 
boundary of the firm. In this case, the nature of the firm as appealing to L and F as principles 
remains unchanged. 
 
Second, changes to preferences expressed in the market may produce a move along the minimal-
maximal spectrum, rather than a change to the boundary of the firm. However, relatively 
consistent changes to preferences will change the whole market context within which all firms 
operate, and suggests the movement of Boundary A.  
 
Figure 4 shows the movement of Boundary A 
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Figure 4: Movement of Boundary A
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Comments on financialisation 
 
We next make some initial comments on financialisation. 
 
The identification of financialisation as a reason for acting provides a more detailed analysis of F. 
Within Boundary A, all firms create narrow financial value measured by making a positive 
financial return to shareholders (or a similar definition).  
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Movement along the low-moderate-high spectrum of financialisation 
 
Movement along the low-moderate-high spectrum of financialisation suggests that a range of 
reasons for acting may be described under principle F, and suggests change to the relative 
significance of financial arrangements for the firm’s reasons for acting.  
 
Low financialisation suggest that firms focus on the production and sale of relatively tangible 
products, both goods and services, as the means to create value. Value is measured financially but 
the firm’s reasons for acting are significantly ‘productionist’5. These firms tend not to consider 
financial operations as a relevant source of profitability. These firms may be predominantly self-
financing with limited active involvement in capital markets.  
 
Small and medium sized firms may be at this point on the low-moderate-high spectrum. This may 
be the dominant territory of traditional firms that operate in the context of productive systems.  
 
Moderate financialisation suggest that firms see financial operations as a necessary complement 
to productive operations and as a potential source of profitability. Competitive investments in 
financial operations may create value but with low potential to put the existing value at risk. 
 
Large sized firms may be at this point on the low-moderate-high spectrum. This may be the 
dominant territory of firms operating in both the context of both productive systems and financial 
systems. 
 
High financialisation suggests that firms rely more significantly on financial transactions as the 
means to generate value. These firms tend to see financial operations as one of the main sources 
of profitability. Significant investment in financial operations may not only not create value but 
may put existing value at risk.  
 
These firms tend to be actively engaged in corporate capital market restructuring and may require 
greater external financing. The firm’s reasons for acting may also prioritise shareholder value 
over other stakeholders interests. This may be the dominant territory of firms operating in the 
context of financial systems.  
 
There are a range of factors that may indicate movement along the low-moderate-high spectrum 
of financialisation and inform a firm’s reasons for acting, for example the nature and extent of the 
portfolio of financial instruments used in the operations of the firm
6
.  
 
Within Boundary A, all firms are seen as creating narrow financial value. The low-moderate-high 
spectrum suggests limiting cases of financialisation. At the ‘high’ end of the spectrum firms may 
be described as points of financialised value creation. At the ‘low’ end firms may be described as 
points of productionist value creation.  
 
 
 
                                                 
5 From Andersson, T. et al. (2007), “Financialized accounts: A stakeholder account of cash distribution in the S&P 500 
(1990-2005)”. 
6 Other factors include: the intensity of financial operations, for example the number of financial transactions per day; 
the magnitude of financial transactions, for example as a percentage of all investments; the extent to which a small 
number of owners or shareholders account for a large proportion of ownership or shares; the range and the degree to 
which the firm’s operations occur in a currency other than its base currency; and, the extent to which the firm uses 
agents in its supply chain as financial sources. 
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Movement beyond and movement of Boundary A 
 
Movement beyond Boundary A suggest change to L and F as principles. This suggests that a 
firm’s reasons for acting may include a view of value creation in addition to financialised or 
productionist value creation. This will require further analysis. 
 
Movement of Boundary A suggests changes to the legislative/regulatory context or relatively 
stable changes to the market situation. The model suggests that this will tend to affect low 
financialised firms to a greater extent than high financialised firms. This may be consistent with 
the effect of these changes on a firm’s operations and products. However, the model does not 
appear to allow for other effects and requires further development. 
 
Corporate responsibility and financialisation 
 
Finally, we will make some observations about the interaction of corporate responsibility and 
financialisation based on the analysis so far. 
 
The model suggests that increasing financialisation may be associated with a reduction in the 
scope of corporate responsibility. As a firm’s reasons for acting become more concerned with 
financial means of creating value, the firm may become less concerned with the direct outcomes 
of it’s activities.  
 
It will be interesting to analyse these effects for firms whose products range from tangible goods 
to more intangible services including financial services. In the latter case, less concern for direct 
outcomes may include the consequences of, for example, consumer credit.  
 
Movement along the minimal-maximal spectrum may suggest that firms take into account the 
reasons of a wider group of stakeholders in addition to shareholders. This may require further 
analysis of reasons that are internal and external to the firm. A high level of financialisation 
suggests that value creation for shareholders has a greater priority than value creation for other 
stakeholders. 
 
The minimal-maximal spectrum may be used to analyse the market pressure for changes to the 
extent of corporate responsibility. This pressure may come from the reasons of at least two groups 
of market agents: consumers and investors. Both consumers and investors may include explicit 
corporate responsibility concerns and requirements as part of their buying and investment 
decisions. Other agents that can discuss also so be discussed.  
 
Firms closer to ‘low financialisation/maximal corporate responsibility’ may be more responsive 
to consumer concerns. Consumers may make buying decisions on the basis of corporate 
responsibility issues raised by products for example, product provenance, working conditions, 
and environmental impacts. 
 
Firms closer to ‘high financialisation/minimal corporate responsibility’ may be less responsive to 
consumer concerns and more responsive to investor concerns. For example, banks and 
institutional investors may have explicit corporate responsibility requirements as part of their 
investment portfolio. This may result in the selection of firms based on an extended view of 
corporate responsibility. Higher financialisation may then increase the responsiveness of firms to 
extended views of corporate responsibility as a result of investor reasons for acting.  
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In some cases the investor may take a ‘high’ financialisation view of the firm, but expect the firm 
to take a less financialised view of its own activities based, for example, on the corporate 
responsibility preferences of consumers. This may suggest a movement of Boundary A where 
these consumer preferences have a relatively consistent effect in the market over time.  
 
On the other hand, high financialisation may reduce direct sensitivity to views about corporate 
responsibility. The diffuse nature of financial markets may disconnect the firm from consumer 
buying decisions and the effect of its outcomes on stakeholders. Value may be created primarily 
or significantly through financial transactions rather than directly through the production and sale 
of products. 
 
Consumers and investors may take different views of the firm. Investors may to see the firm as a 
unit of financialised value creation. In this sense investors may hold a view of the firm closer to 
high financialisation/minimal corporate responsibility. Consumers may see the firm as a value 
creator through the products that it produces. In this sense customers may hold a view of the firm 
closer to low financialisation/maximal corporate responsibility. 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
We close this paper with these initial and speculative observations about corporate responsibility 
and financialisation. We hope we have developed a series of arguments that stimulate further 
analysis of these issues, and welcome the opportunity to continue the discussion.  
